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Abstract
Fault injection, a critical aspect of testing robust sys-
tems, is often overlooked in the development of general-
purpose software. We believe this is due to the absence of
easy-to-use tools and to the extensive manual labor required
to perform fault injection tests. This paper introduces LFI
(Library Fault Injector), a tool that automates the prepa-
ration of fault scenarios and their injection at the bound-
ary between shared libraries and applications. LFI extends
prior work by automatically profiling fault behaviors of li-
braries via static analysis of their binaries, thus reducing
the dependence on human labor and perfect documenta-
tion. We present techniques for automatically generating
injection scenarios and we describe a simple language for
expressing such scenarios. LFI does not require access to
libraries’ source code and works for Linux, Windows, and
Solaris on x86 and SPARC platforms.
1. Introduction
General-purpose applications rely heavily on shared li-
braries. For example, we found that the MySQL database
server directly links to 13 shared libraries, the Apache Web
server can link to more than 30 shared libraries depend-
ing on compile options and Adobe Photoshop directly links
to 36 shared libraries. If we count recursively the shared
libraries used by libraries themselves, the numbers are as
high as 138 in the case of Adobe Photoshop.
These applications make important assumptions about
how the underlying libraries work, and any guarantees they
try to provide to users depend heavily on the correctness of
such assumptions. For software that is expected to be highly
dependable (database servers, Web servers, email clients,
etc.) testing must verify that the ways in which applica-
tions use these libraries is consistent with the actual library
behavior. In particular, it is essential to verify that the appli-
cations correctly handle faults at or below the library layer
that manifest as errors returned by the library functions.
Unfortunately, corner cases are easy to miss and can lead
to crashes or correctness violations, such as when the result
of a memory allocation is not checked, or when a read()
call is not retried after getting an EINTR return code. These
bugs are hard to find through input testing, because they
are triggered by low-probability events that are typically
input-independent and occur below the library layer. To test
program robustness, we wish to simulate such error events
at the program/library interface and then observe the pro-
gram’s reaction. Ideally, the simulation should be mini-
mally invasive and should not require access to proprietary
portions (e.g., source code) of the program or library.
The challenge, though, is that regular systems have an
overwhelming number of libraries: a typical Linux system
has ∼1000 libraries, Windows XP ∼1400, and Windows
Vista ∼1650. To our knowledge, current library fault injec-
tors require considerable amounts of manual work and are
restricted to the C standard library (libc), thus not scaling to
test all libraries used by programs. Library fault injection
must therefore be generalized and automated to the utmost,
or else the scope of testing will have to stay narrow.
Not only is it necessary to automate the injection of
faults, but also the inference of the libraries’ fault profiles.
Libraries can change frequently; e.g., GNU libc, perhaps
the most widely used shared library, has already seen two
releases in the first three months of this year [8]. By us-
ing shared libraries, applications accept that these libraries
may change underneath them; yet, can they suitably cope?
Frequent changes can introduce unexpected new behavior,
much of which may not even be documented. While many
libraries aim for backward compatibility, even GNU libc
has not always guaranteed compatibility.
Relying on documentation to decide how a library may
expose faults is risky: even if the documentation exists and
is correct for one library version, it can get out of sync
with the next one. As we show in §3.1, library documen-
tation can be incomplete and miss some of the error return
codes. We must therefore extract information on the po-
tential errors directly from the libraries; since source code
is often not available, the library binaries themselves must
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be analyzed. Finally, since libraries can have hundreds of
functions in their API, we must automatically generate test
scenarios and allow developers to tweak them, instead of
requiring them to write tests from scratch.
In this paper we introduce LFI, a tool for automated
library fault injection. We wish to make fault injection
easy to adopt in the development of general-purpose soft-
ware, where programmers must be very agile and are sub-
ject to constraints different from those encountered in build-
ing safety-critical systems. LFI consists of two parts: a pro-
filer and a controller. The profiler uses static analysis of
libraries’ binaries to extract their fault profiles and to de-
termine the side channels used to communicate failure in-
formation (such as errno in libc). The profiler also gener-
ates fault injection scenarios. The controller uses profile in-
formation to synthesize an interceptor library that can then
drive automated injection of fault scenarios.
In the rest of this paper we provide an overview of
LFI (§2), describe the LFI profiler (§3), fault scenario gen-
eration (§4), and the LFI controller (§5). We then evaluate
LFI (§6), survey related work (§7), and conclude (§8).
2. System Overview
The goal of the LFI fault injector is to give testers a fast,
easy and comprehensive method to test program robustness
in the face of failures that are exposed at the interface be-
tween shared libraries and the programs under test. We en-
vision LFI being used not only by testers and researchers
evaluating their software prototypes, but also by customers
who want to validate closed-source products, or in bench-
marks that compare in a systematic way the fault-tolerance
of different applications. LFI can also be used as an explo-
ration tool, to understand the behavior of third-party code.
LFI can be downloaded from http://lfi.epfl.ch/.
Using LFI consists of two steps: (a) profile the target ap-
plication’s shared libraries to determine a set of meaningful
faults to inject, and (b) conduct fault injection experiments
using various fault scenarios. This is reflected in LFI’s ar-
chitecture (Figure 1).
Testers point LFI at a target application and the profiler
automatically finds which shared libraries the application
links to and then profiles them. For each library, it deter-
mines the exported functions and, for each exported func-
tion, the possible error return values—we refer to this in-
formation as the library’s fault profile. LFI does not re-
quire symbols and works on both stripped and unstripped
libraries; of course, for a library to be useful, libraries must
provide symbols for their exported function signatures.
Since profiles are obtained automatically, testers do not
need to be familiar with the internals of the libraries. How-
ever, if they do have such knowledge or additional domain-
specific information, they can alter the generated profiles to
obtain faster, more accurate results (e.g., by removing func-
tions or faults that are not of interest).
libc.profile
libssl.profile
...
      Application
(MySQL, Oracle, ...)
LFI Controller
lib
c.s
o
lib
ssl
.so ...
Test workload
test log
fault replay scripts 
   LFI
Profiler
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Figure 1. Architecture of the LFI fault injector.
The LFI controller receives these fault profiles and com-
bines them with a fault scenario specification to drive the
fault injection. The controller is a transparent shim inter-
posed between the application and the libraries; it intercepts
the calls to libraries and injects the desired error codes. In
order to be useful “out of the box”, LFI automatically gen-
erates a set of simple fault scenarios—exhaustive injection
and random injection—so, in many cases, testers need not
do any manual work. The scenarios can, however, be freely
modified after the automatic generation. We show in §6 how
random fault injection found a previously-unknown bug in
Pidgin, a popular instant messenger client.
The output of LFI experiments is a test report and gener-
ated scripts that can replay the injections, enabling develop-
ers to debug and test in more detail the scenarios of interest.
The results in the report can pinpoint bugs or weak spots
in the target software that may be good targets for further
examination. The replay scripts can then be incorporated in
regression test suites of the target system.
3. LFI Profiler
The interface of a library consists of a set of functions
“exported” to programs that use the library. The LFI profiler
statically analyzes the library to identify the error return val-
ues for every exported function (§3.1). Some libraries pro-
vide additional details about error conditions through vari-
ous side effects; LFI identifies these side channels as well
(§3.2). The LFI profiler then outputs a fault profile (§3.3).
3.1. Return Code Analysis
We designed LFI to work directly on the libraries’ bina-
ries, because requiring access to source code would hamper
the practicality of LFI. First, source code may be unavail-
able, as is the case for most of the DLLs on Microsoft Win-
dows systems. Second, obtaining source code matching the
exact versions of the libraries being used may be difficult
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(e.g., the original GNU libc code is slightly different from
the version used by RedHat Linux, which in turn differs
from the version used by Ubuntu Linux). Third, handling
large source code bases for all the required libraries, with
each one having its own set of compile and build require-
ments, would involve substantial manual work. We believe
this would deter practitioners from adopting LFI.
The LFI profiler disassembles the library and identifies
all exported functions, along with the dependent functions,
i.e., other internal or exported functions that are invoked by
the exported functions. Dependencies are determined recur-
sively, both within the same library and other libraries called
by the current one. It then constructs for each function a
control flow graph (CFG), like the one shown in Figure 2.
LFI uses platform-specific tools, such as ldd and objdump
on Linux and Solaris, and dumpbin on Windows.
start
08048524<_Z4blahi>:  
8048524:  push   ebp
8048525:  mov    ebp,esp
8048527:  sub    esp,0x10
804852a:  cmp    DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0x0
804852e:  jne    8048539 <_Z4blahi+0x15>
8048539:  cmp    DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0x1
804853d:  jne    8048546 <_Z4blahi+0x22>
8048530:  mov    DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x0
8048537:  jmp    8048546 <_Z4blahi+0x22>
8048546:  mov    eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
8048549:  leave  
804854a:  ret    
804853f:  mov    DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0x5
Figure 2. A simple example of a control flow graph
for an exported library function.
In most libraries, return codes are constants, typically de-
fined with #define directives; these codes end up stored in
a memory location or register (we refer to both of these as
locations). For each assignment of a constant to a location,
the static analyzer looks for the paths through the CFG that
propagate this constant to the return location in an exit ba-
sic block. For most application binary interfaces (ABIs) the
return value is placed in a well-defined location. For exam-
ple, in the case of the Intel ABI, the return value is placed in
the eax register, so we need to find the paths that propagate
constants to the last eax write before a return instruction.
To make this path search efficient, the LFI profiler trans-
forms the CFG G(V, E), which has basic blocks B1, B2, ...
as vertices, into another graph G′(V ′, E′), with V ′ = V ×
{l1, l2, ...}, where li are the locations to which constants are
written. E′ = {(<Bs, li>,<Bd, lj>) | (Bs, Bd) ∈ E ∧
li is propagated to lj by Bs}. We say li is “propagated” to
lj by basic block B if the content of li is used to compute
and write the contents of lj within B. For calls to depen-
dent functions, we consider all of the dependent function’s
return values (determined recursively) to be propagated.
The profiler identifies all writes to the return location
preceding a return instruction and searches from this point
in reverse, to find all paths in G′ along which constants can
be propagated to that location. One could think of this algo-
rithm as a “reverse” constant propagation. Constant folding
is not necessary, since compilers automatically do this when
generating the library code, so the disassembled code offers
no opportunity for further folding. We have not encountered
any problems related to pointer aliasing in practice; it ap-
pears that modern compilers prefer to use the same canoni-
cal location to refer to these variables. To reduce the search
space, the profiler generates G′ on-demand, only expanding
the nodes of interest.
In order to avoid injecting “obvious” non-faults, LFI can
optionally apply two heuristics. First, it tries to distinguish
success from error returns, to avoid injecting success re-
turns; this heuristic removes 0-return values from all func-
tions for which more than one constant return value were
found (if only 0 was found, it is likely a null pointer re-
turn). Second, the LFI profiler eliminates short functions
that return 1 or 0 and only check for conditions of the type
isFile(); LFI infers that neither return value reflects a
failure. Since both heuristics are unsound, they are disabled
by default in LFI—we prefer to risk injecting some non-
faults rather than miss valid faults.
A special type of dependency occurs in the C and C++
standard libraries (libc and libstdc++): they wrap kernel
system calls, so many dependent functions reside in the ker-
nel. LFI therefore performs static analysis on the kernel im-
age as well, to identify the error codes that originate in the
kernel and may be propagated by the libraries.
An alternative to the LFI approach is to obtain error re-
turn codes by parsing documentation. This approach has
two main drawbacks. First, the analysis cannot be accurate,
because documentation often uses natural language that is
potentially confusing, such as “the same errors that occur
for link(2) can also occur for linkat()” in the linkat man
page, or “returns 0 if successful, a positive error code oth-
erwise” in the libxml2 documentation.
Second, documentation can be inconsistent. E.g., the
modify ldt man page claims three possible return val-
ues (EFAULT, EINVAL and ENOSYS), yet the LFI profiler
found a fourth one (ENOMEM), confirmed through code in-
spection. We found similar inconsistencies in libxml2,
where htmlParseDocument is alleged to only return 0 or
-1 for success/failure, but it turns out it can also return 1
in some failure cases. Such disparities between documen-
tation and reality can be the very source of program bugs,
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so an effective fault injection tool must be aware of them.
LFI’s fault profiles could be improved based on documen-
tation, but this requires manual vetting.
It is possible to avoid analyzing exported library func-
tions that the target program never calls, and thus save some
profiling time. In LFI we opted to profile all exported func-
tions of a library, because profiling is fast anyway (∼20 sec-
onds for the biggest libraries), and we wish to reuse profiles
across multiple programs once they have been generated.
The LFI profiler is relatively portable: it obtains the ex-
ported symbols for a shared object file, disassembles it, and
builds the control flow graph—these are steps that are per-
formed using standard tools on most general-purpose plat-
forms. The CFG analyses are independent of the ABI and
platform features. As will be seen in §6.3, the LFI pro-
filer currently works for three platforms: Linux/x86, Win-
dows/x86 and Solaris/SPARC.
Limitations: Fault profiles may include false positives,
i.e., return codes that can be returned by the corresponding
function only when certain combinations of arguments are
provided. For example, the read function in libc can return
-1 and set errno to EWOULDBLOCK only when it is passed
an asynchronous file descriptor. Inferring the relationship
between arguments can be done using symbolic execution,
but the current LFI prototype does not support this yet.
Indirect calls can pose a challenge to LFI’s inter-
procedural constant propagation analysis. For such cases,
the LFI controller could dynamically resolve indirect calls
at runtime and inject the return codes corresponding to the
function being called. However, prior work [17] and our
own experience indicates that indirect calls are highly un-
common, even in event-driven object-oriented code. More-
over, our analysis of real libraries found that only 2.28%
(758 out of 33,122) of indirect calls could actually affect
the profiler’s accuracy in static error code propagation.
In theory, indirect branches can make building the CFG
hard. However, we analyzed 9,633 functions in 30 com-
monly used libraries and found that only 0.13% branches
(104 out of 78,292) were indirect. The LFI prototype cur-
rently ignores the resulting CFG incompleteness.
LFI must be able to disassemble the libraries in order
to analyze them; this may not work if the code is obfus-
cated. Fortunately, [17] reports that over 99% disassembly
accuracy can be achieved in commercial grade applications.
Since the LFI profiler and disassembler are loosely coupled,
it is possible to use as good a disassembler as is available.
3.2. Side-Effects Analysis
Besides error return values, library functions may com-
municate to callers additional information regarding the en-
countered error, via channels such as output parameters,
global variables, or thread local storage (TLS) variables,
like errno. The LFI profiler automatically discovers and
analyzes such side effects.
Shared libraries on most platforms consist of position-
independent code (PIC), i.e., machine code that executes
properly regardless of where it is loaded in memory. In PIC,
all instructions referring to memory addresses use relative
addressing. For example, in Linux, the ebx/ecx registers
are loaded with the instruction pointer in the function pro-
logue and subsequently used as a base address for access-
ing global or TLS variables. The LFI profiler starts out by
finding the possible return codes and then it scans the ba-
sic blocks that contain the constant assignments, searching
for possible writes to global/TLS variables. These writes
are identified based on the use of the base address for com-
puting the memory location to write to; propagating error
codes to these locations is considered a side effect.
We illustrate with an example from GNU libc, where a
function sets the errno TLS variable and places the return
value in the eax register after a syscall returned an error:
1. call f8596 <__frame_state_for+0xb96>
2. add ecx,0x7c91c
3. mov ecx,DWORD PTR [ecx-0x20]
4. add ecx,DWORD PTR gs:0x0
5. xor edx,edx
6. sub edx,eax
7. mov DWORD PTR [ecx],edx
8. or eax,0xffffffff
Line 1 uses the standard PIC way of obtaining the current
instruction pointer. In lines 2-4, it computes the address of
the errno variable. Lines 5 and 6 compute the value to be
stored in errno as the negative value of eax, in accordance
with the Linux system call standard, and line 7 stores the
value into errno. Finally, line 8 sets the return value of the
function to -1. The profiler first finds line 8, then detects
the side effect by analyzing the containing basic block; it
concludes that exposing the error requires the injector to
place -1 in eax and also set errno accordingly.
We take a similar approach for side effects reflected
in output arguments, i.e., when the function writes to ad-
dresses passed in as arguments. Such output arguments
are always found at a well known location—positive off-
sets from the base stack pointer when using frame pointers
on the IA32 architecture, or stack/register combinations in
general—so the LFI profiler detects writes to addresses ob-
tained from such positive offsets. E.g., on IA32, we modi-
fied the algorithm used to detect possible return values such
that it performs a forward search and looks for constant
propagations to locations of the form [ebp+??], instead
of eax. If a chain of basic blocks that sets the return value
also intersects a chain of blocks that propagates a constant
to an [ebp+??] location, we consider it to be a side effect.
4
In order to understand how frequently the different ways
of propagating error information are used in practice, we
analyzed >20,000 functions in the Ubuntu Linux libraries.
We used the ELSA C/C++ parser [6] to analyze the library
headers in all the development packages, and combined this
information with the LFI analyses described above. The re-
sults are summarized in Table 1—row labels indicate func-
tion return type, column labels indicate the method for pro-
viding error details, and values in cells indicate the cor-
responding fraction of all the functions we analyzed. We
found that more than 90% of the exported functions in
Linux shared libraries do not have side effects.
Return None Error details in Error details
Type global location via arguments
void 23.0% 0% 0%
scalar 56.5% 1% 3.5%
pointer 11.6% 1% 3.4%
Table 1. Statistics on how Linux libraries provide ad-
ditional details on error conditions exposed to callers.
3.3. Fault Profile
The output of the LFI profiler is a fault profile of the
analyzed library. This output is meant to be passed to the
LFI controller, but it could also be used for other purposes,
such as cross-checking API documentation. We therefore
chose a general XML format that is both human-readable
and easy to parse.
LFI generates one profile per analyzed library. For each
exported function, the profile contains information regard-
ing possible error return values, along with a specification
of associated side effects for each such value. Here is a snip-
pet of the profile generated for the libc close function:
<profile>
...
<function name="close">
<error-codes retval="-1">
<side-effect type="TLS"
module="libc.so.6" offset="12FFF4">
-9
</side-effect>
<side-effect type="TLS"
module="libc.so.6" offset="12FFF4">
-5
</side-effect>
<side-effect type="TLS"
module="libc.so.6" offset="12FFF4">
-4
</side-effect>
</error-codes>
</function>
...
</profile>
In case of error, close returns -1 and provides additional
information via a TLS variable (errno) at the given offset.
This side effect can be value -9 (corresponding to EBADF =
bad file descriptor), -5 (for EIO = input/output error), or -4
(for EINTR = interrupted system call).
Incidentally, this is another example where man pages
can be deceiving: on BSD systems, the man page accurately
states that close can only set errno to EBADF or EINTR.
On Linux, EIO is also possible, so programmers porting
from BSD to Linux might forget to add a check for EIO;
similarly, if porting to HP/UX they might forget to check for
ENOSPC, or on Solaris they might forget about ENOLINK, all
of which are return codes present in the corresponding libc
libraries. LFI can automatically find the errors specific to
the platform and test the programs with those values.
4. Fault Injection Scenarios
A fault injection scenario describes a sequence of faults
to be injected; it can also be referred to as “faultload.” Such
a scenario pairs faults with triggers, i.e., conditions that,
when true, should lead to an injection.
We designed a simple XML-based language to describe
scenarios as sets of <trigger, fault> tuples. Every time a
function is intercepted, the relevant triggers are evaluated
and, if any is true, the associated fault(s) is/are injected.
Due to space constraints, we do not describe the language
in detail, but provide an illustrative example below:
<plan>
<function name="readdir64" inject="5" retval="0"
errno="EBADF" calloriginal="false" />
<function name="readdir" inject="5" retval="0"
errno="EBADF" calloriginal="false">
<stacktrace>
<frame>0xb824490</frame>
<frame>refresh_files</frame>
</stacktrace>
</function>
<function name="read" inject="20"
calloriginal="true">
<modify argument="3" op="sub" value="10" />
</function>
...
</plan>
The first <function ... /> trigger matches the 5th
call to function readdir64 and returns value 0 (null
pointer), sets errno to EBADF (“bad file descriptor”), and
does not call the original readdir64 function. The second
trigger matches the 5th call to function readdir and, if
the call stack has the address 0xb824490 in the first frame
and function refresh files in the second frame, it injects
EBADF. The third trigger matches the 20th call of the read
function, modifies its 3rd argument (the number of bytes to
be read) by subtracting 10 from it, and then passes the call
on to the original read library call.
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The current LFI prototype automatically generates two
types of scenarios: exhaustive and random. In the exhaus-
tive case, every exported function of every linked library
is included, and consecutive calls to an exported function
iterate through the possible error codes. In the random sce-
nario, LFI takes as argument a probability, which is then
used to randomly select both which call will return an error
code and which particular error code it should return.
LFI allows testers to customize generated scenarios by
using domain-specific knowledge: they might restrict the
function calls to only a subset of interest, or specify a (par-
tial) stack trace as a condition that must be matched by the
runtime backtrace in order to trigger an injection. Scenar-
ios can also be hand-written by testers, based on the library
fault profiles. The random scenario is useful for quick-and-
dirty testing, when testers have limited time and do not want
to customize the fault scenarios, or when they lack specific
knowledge that could target the testing better.
To help bootstrap fault injection testing experiments, LFI
also comes with several ready-made fault scenarios for libc,
such as all faults related to file I/O, all memory allocation
faults, or all socket I/O faults.
5. LFI Controller
The LFI controller (Figure 3) receives from the profiler
the fault profile(s) of interest along with a fault scenario, ei-
ther automatically generated by the profiler or customized
by the developer. It then generates interception stubs which
are combined with boilerplate code to synthesize a new li-
brary. This synthetic library has the same API as the origi-
nal one, but underneath this API encodes the fault injection
logic. This new library is shimmed between the program
being tested and the original library(ies).
stub generator
C code
boilerplate
program
under
test
new libX.so
original
libX.so
libX.profile
fault scenario
log
LFI Controller
replay
scripts
Figure 3. The LFI controller.
Once the stubs are generated and installed (§5.1), the LFI
controller invokes a developer-provided script that starts the
program under test, exercises it with the desired workload,
and monitors its behavior to determine whether it terminates
normally or with an error exit code. This information is
collected in a log, along with an LFI-generated replay script
for each fault injection test case; the test scripts allow the
developer to diagnose and debug (see §5.2).
5.1. Interception Mechanics
The shimming of the synthesized library is system-
specific. On Linux and Solaris, LFI uses the LD PRELOAD
environment variable to tell the dynamic linker to load the
LFI-generated library before the original one. On Win-
dows, LFI uses a combination of WriteProcessMemory/
CreateRemoteThread, and passes the address of
LoadLibrary as the thread start address, to force a
process to load the synthetic library.
A synthesized library consists of stubs that intercept the
library calls. Each stub determines the address of the origi-
nal function, evaluates the triggers from the scenario and, if
an injection is to be done, determines the return value/side
effect to be injected and/or whether the call should be
passed to the original function or not. If no injection is
to be done, it cleans up the stack and jumps to the origi-
nal function. In general, using a jmp instruction (instead of
call) simplifies the handling of the original return address
from the stack, because it avoids the need for save/restore.
A stub looks approximately as follows:
int LIB_FUNC_NAME(void) {
static void * (*original_fn_ptr)();
static int call_count;
call_count++;
if (!original_fn_ptr)
original_fn_ptr = (void* (*)())
dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, #FUNC_NAME);
if (eval_trigger(LIB_FUNC_NAME,
call_count, call_stack)) {
/* determine return_code, side_effects */
/* apply side_effects */
return return_code;
} else {
/* return stack and registers to orig values */
__asm__("jmp [original_fn_ptr]");
/* orig func will return directly to caller */
}
}
Interceptors for multiple libraries can coexist (see §6.4).
This happens transparently, because the interception mech-
anism only relies on the function name, not on the library
where the original function resides; thus, stubs for functions
from different libraries do not interfere with each other.
Although interception is specific to the OS and CPU ar-
chitecture, porting to new platforms is straightforward.
5.2. Controller Output
The LFI controller collects information that helps devel-
opers reproduce, understand, and fix the behaviors observed
as a result of fault injection.
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The LFI log is a text file that records each injection, the
applied side effects, and the events that triggered that injec-
tion (e.g., call count, stack trace). This output can be used
to match injections to observed program behavior, as well
as to refine the fault scenario.
The replay scripts are automatically-generated XML
files that can be fed back to the LFI controller to reproduce
the desired test case on a subsequent run. Replay is not al-
ways 100% accurate, because LFI does not control thread
interleaving, timer inputs, etc. We have found that these re-
play scripts can save a lot of time during ad-hoc testing, and
can also augment existing regression test suites.
6. Evaluation
Our goal in building LFI was to make testing based on
fault injection easier and less human-intensive; in this sec-
tion we evaluate the extent to which we reached this goal.
We analyze the effectiveness of using LFI in testing (§6.1),
measure its efficiency (§6.2), assess the accuracy of the LFI
profiler (§6.3), and measure the performance overhead in-
curred during testing (§6.4). LFI currently works on Linux
and Windows (both Intel IA-32 and IA-64 architectures), as
well as Solaris (SPARC architecture). We expect LFI to be
easily ported to other systems as well.
6.1. Effectiveness
Ease of Use: LFI’s primary contribution is ease of use.
The human effort involved in the basic use of LFI is small:
it requires issuing two commands, one for profiling and one
for running the tests. When the tester modifies the default
fault profiles, more time is required, but we expect this to
be easier than directly scripting fault injection experiments.
Below, we illustrate LFI usage with an example.
We tested Pidgin [15], a popular instant messenger
client, by instructing the LFI controller to launch it and ex-
ercise a random fault injection scenario on I/O functions
with 10% probability. Shortly after we entered the IM login
details in Pidgin, it crashed with a SIGABRT.
We restarted Pidgin using the corresponding replay
script and attached with gdb; it crashed again and we were
able to inspect the program state. In a matter of minutes,
we discovered the issue: Pidgin forks a DNS resolver pro-
cess to perform host resolution asynchronously; this process
then communicates back to the parent via a pipe. The child
does not handle the case when writes fail or are incomplete.
As a result, the child may write the answer to the parent,
but, if the write is incomplete, it may subsequently write
additional data corresponding to another request. As a re-
sult, the parent reads the status (which is ok), and then reads
the size of the (resolved) address—due to the partial write,
this read returns data written after the injection, in our case
a very large value. The parent calls malloc for this amount
of memory, which results in SIGABRT, because it is unable
to allocate the memory. Further details appear in the bug
report we filed [16].
Improving Coverage: Besides ease-of-use, effectiveness
can also be measured by whether LFI can improve existing
regression test suites. We considered the MySQL database
server, which is the most mature open-source RDBMS,
first released in 1995; it claims 11 million installations [4].
MySQL ships with its own thorough test suite. The MySQL
5.0 test suite achieves 73% overall basic block coverage,
which is remarkable for an open-source project; we there-
fore set out to see if we can improve this with no human
effort.
We ran LFI in fully automatic mode, generating a ran-
dom fault injection scenario based on libc. With no human
help, LFI improved the coverage of the MySQL test suite to
at least 74% overall; in some modules (such as the InnoDB
ibuf implementation) coverage improved by 12%. We ex-
pect the coverage numbers to be slightly higher, because in
12 cases MySQL crashed with SIGSEGV and the coverage
information for those test cases was not saved. We are en-
couraged by the fact that, with no human assistance, LFI
was able to improve a mature, extensive test suite.
Finding Obscure Scenarios: A third aspect of effective-
ness is whether LFI is able to exercise scenarios that ex-
isting tools would not find. As already mentioned in §3.1
and §3.3, the LFI profiler found several return error codes
that are missing from the API documentation of popular li-
braries. By analyzing directly the binary, LFI helps testers
find fault scenarios that they would otherwise not be aware
of; knowing these additional fault scenarios enables testers
to write more thorough tests.
6.2. Efficiency
The running time of a test tool is an important factor in
its adoption, because testers are generally unwilling to wait
long for results. For example, the long running times of
model checkers have discouraged their wide use in testing.
The LFI profiler is fast: we measured profiling time ranging
from 0.2 seconds for a small library (libdmx, with 18 ex-
ported functions and an 8 KB code segment) to 20 seconds
for a large library (libxml2, with 1612 exported functions
and a 897 KB code segment). To profile the >1,000 li-
braries found on a typical Linux system takes several hours,
but in practice we expect testers to only profile the libraries
used by the program of interest. When updating a library
on the system, which we expect will happen about once a
month, it takes on the order of minutes to re-analyze the
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updated library and its dependencies in order to update the
library fault profile.
Profiling time is mainly influenced by code size (i.e.,
number of machine instructions). The number of hops in
the propagation of return codes to the eax (or equivalent)
register also has an impact, but we have found this number
to be always 3 or less, due to compiler optimizations like
constant propagation and constant folding, so its effect is
negligible.
6.3. Accuracy
Accuracy of the profiler can be expressed as
TP/(TP+FN+FP), i.e., the ratio of true positives to the
sum of true positives, false negatives, and false positives.
A true positive is an error return code that was correctly
found; a false negative is a returnable error that was not
found; a false positive is a reported error code that cannot
actually be returned. A factor that can influence accuracy is
the number of indirect branches and indirect calls, because,
as explained in §3.1, indirection poses a challenge to the
static analyzer. Accuracy is also influenced by library
design: the number of false positives increases as functions
maintain more state from one call to another, based on
which they decide the appropriate return value.
For evaluation purposes, the “ground truth” for deciding
what is a false vs. true positive or negative cannot be easily
determined, because written documentation is not reliable;
if we wanted precise numbers, labor-intensive manual code
inspection would be required. We performed such an anal-
ysis on a small library (libpcre, with 20 exported functions)
and found the accuracy to be 84% (52 true positives, 10
false negatives, 0 false positives).
To scale the evaluation, we considered 18 additional li-
braries on 3 platforms, but this time we considered the
ground truth to be the documentation. We wrote documen-
tation parsers for each of the measured libraries. While this
evaluation is inexact, it is the only practical method of com-
parison. In Table 2 we show the results of running the LFI
profiler on the respective binaries.
With no access to documentation, source code, or hu-
man assistance, the LFI profiler achieves on the order of
80%-90% accuracy. False negatives result in missed fault
scenarios, while false positives result in time wasted by the
developer verifying that the injected fault condition cannot
actually occur in practice. Should structured documenta-
tion exist and a documentation parser be available, it can
be combined with LFI’s static analysis to yield higher accu-
racy.
Library Plat- Accuracy TPs FNs FPs
form
libssl Windows 87% 164 18 6
libxml2 Solaris 81% 1003 138 88
libpanel Solaris 100% 23 0 0
libpctx Solaris 83% 10 0 2
libldap Linux 85% 368 45 21
libxml2 Linux 80% 989 152 102
libXss Linux 92% 12 1 0
libgtkspell Linux 100% 7 0 0
libpanel Linux 91% 21 2 0
libdmx Linux 76% 26 8 0
libao Linux 80% 12 3 0
libhesiod Linux 100% 10 0 0
libnetfilter q Linux 92% 24 2 0
libcdt Linux 100% 15 0 0
libdaemon Linux 91% 30 3 0
libdns sd Linux 89% 50 4 2
libgimpthumb Linux 84% 31 3 3
libvorbisfile Linux 75% 133 4 39
Table 2. Profiler accuracy with no human assistance,
no documentation, and no source code, on Linux/x86,
Solaris/SPARC, and Windows/x86. We show true
positive (TPs), false negatives (FNs), and false pos-
itives (FPs) relative to library documentation.
6.4. Performance Overhead
The final question we wish to address is whether the pro-
cess of injecting library-level faults slows down the system
to the point that its behavior is no longer representative. If
this was the case, the value of testing would be decreased.
We measured the overhead introduced by the LFI con-
troller in the AB [2] benchmark on the Apache httpd server,
while LFI was simultaneously performing fault injection on
the calls to GNU libc, libapr, and libaprutil. GNU libc is a
large library, with 1535 exported functions, while the two
libraries comprising the Apache Portable Runtime (APR)
are medium-sized, totaling a little over 1,000 functions.
We allowed LFI to produce a random fault injection
plan with 10 triggers on the top-10-most-called functions
in Apache httpd, 100 triggers on the top-100, 500 triggers
on the top-300, and 1,000 triggers on the top-300, respec-
tively (in the last two cases, there were multiple triggers for
the same function, corresponding to different error returns).
In these experiments, LFI always passes the call through to
the original library after evaluating the trigger, in order to
allow Apache to properly complete the benchmark. In each
test we ran 1,000 requests with AB.
Table 3 summarizes two sets of results, obtained with
two different workloads: static HTML and PHP. The latter
is more dynamic and performs many more library calls than
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the former, which implies that the triggers have to be eval-
uated considerably more times. As can be seen, the over-
heads introduced by trigger evaluation are negligible.
Static HTML PHP
Baseline (no LFI) 0.151 sec 1.51 sec
10 triggers 0.156 sec 1.53 sec
100 triggers 0.156 sec 1.53 sec
500 triggers 0.158 sec 1.57 sec
1,000 triggers 0.159 sec 1.60 sec
Table 3. Runtime overhead of using LFI in the Apache
httpd server with three simultaneous libraries (GNU
libc, libapr, and libaprutil). We report completion
time of 1,000 AB requests. The baseline represents
Apache httpd without any interference from LFI.
We also ran the SysBench [23] Online Transaction Pro-
cessing (OLTP) benchmark on the MySQL RDBMS with
LFI applied to GNU libc; we varied the number of triggers
from 10 to 1,000. Table 4 shows the results for two different
workloads: read-only and read-write queries.
Read-only Read/Write
Baseline (no LFI) 465.28 txns/sec 112.62 txns/sec
10 triggers 464.48 txns/sec 112.08 txns/sec
100 triggers 463.19 txns/sec 111.53 txns/sec
500 triggers 460.80 txns/sec 110.88 txns/sec
1000 triggers 459.39 txns/sec 110.10 txns/sec
Table 4. Runtime overhead while applying LFI to the
MySQL database server. We report number of trans-
actions per second, as reported by SysBench OLTP.
As in the Apache case, the runtime overhead during test-
ing is negligible, even for a large number of triggers. It is
apparent that overhead is influenced both by how intensely
the program uses the profiled library and how many triggers
are present in the fault injection plan.
7. Related Work
Performing fault injection at the software level is attrac-
tive, because it does not require expensive hardware mecha-
nisms, and it can be used to target various layers in the soft-
ware stack. Software fault injectors can either be inserted
directly into applications, or can be shimmed between ex-
isting layers of the software stack.
Software fault injection has seen varied uses in the liter-
ature, ranging from use as a method for testing the robust-
ness of device drivers [1] to testing general-purpose operat-
ing systems [9, 13, 11, 12, 10, 3] to mission-critical systems
and real-time systems [18, 19].
NFTAPE [20] is an example of a fault injection frame-
work that can inject various low-level faults with the main
purpose of assessing dependability of distributed systems.
In our experience, establishing the mapping between low-
level faults and higher-level application events across sev-
eral layers of the software stack is not easy, making diagno-
sis and debugging tedious.
Our work is focused on library-level fault injection, be-
cause we view this as an ideal layer for doing realistic test-
ing: it is the interface that is most likely to expose applica-
tions to failures that occur in their environment.
Work related to this idea includes Ballista [14], an early
system for testing the robustness of a library or operating
system API by passing boundary values as arguments. It re-
lies on domain-specific knowledge to select arguments that
will stress the tested component and also needs access to
the corresponding function prototypes. Similarly, HEAL-
ERS [7] searches for arguments that can cause a library
function to crash; it then generates wrappers that protect
the vulnerable functions from the pathogenic arguments.
Our work operates in the opposite direction: we test the
application by giving it error return values from the library.
This way, we verify that the program reacts properly to the
exposed error conditions, e.g., check how it handles situa-
tions when malloc is unable to allocate memory.
Research interest in this type of library-level fault injec-
tion is relatively recent and, to our knowledge, debuted with
FIG [5], a tool used to verify the recovery mechanisms of
applications that use the GNU libc (glibc) library. FIG in-
jects faults solely in calls to glibc and requires that the in-
jectable glibc errors be hardcoded. In contrast, LFI can be
used with any library and automatically generates stubs that
perform complete fault injection, including side effects. We
also offer control over the injection process via an XML-
based fault description language to flexibly specify injection
scenarios.
Su¨ßkraut & Fetzer [21] introduced a system that finds ap-
plication problems via library-level fault injection and then
patches the applications to protect against these faults. The
system is limited to libc and relies on man pages to deter-
mine possible error return values. As shown in §3.1 and
§3.3, man pages can sometimes be incorrect, so in LFI we
extend the man page parsing approach with static analysis
of the library binaries, to automatically extract error return
codes. [21] also requires information on the function proto-
types in the form of header files to generate corresponding
wrappers and uses systematic error injection. LFI elimi-
nates the need for header files and decouples the specifica-
tion of fault scenarios from the fault injection mechanism,
thus allowing for more flexible test scenarios (systematic,
random, custom, etc.).
Su¨ßkraut & Fetzer [22] further introduced a technique
for learning library-level error return values by injecting
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system call errors (i.e., faults at the boundary between the
operating system and the library) and observing their prop-
agation to the libc interface. The LFI profiler uses static
analysis of binaries, because the system call injection ap-
proach is limited to libc (the only library that directly ac-
cesses the system call interface), and it requires recompil-
ing the kernel, in order to export the system call table. We
believe that direct analysis of the binaries makes LFI more
widely applicable.
8. Conclusion
We presented LFI, a tool for making fault injection-
based testing more efficient and accessible to developers
and testers. LFI injects faults at the boundary between
shared libraries and target programs, in order to verify
whether the programs correctly handle failures exposed by
the libraries. LFI automatically extracts information from
the binary libraries regarding possible error return codes
and their side effects. Based on this fault profile, LFI gen-
erates various fault injection scenarios, which can be used
directly or modified as desired by testers. Based on the fault
profile and scenario, LFI synthesizes a shim library that in-
jects the desired faults and records the behavior of the target
program.
LFI generalizes to the shared libraries found on com-
mon Linux, Windows, and Solaris systems, and profiling
takes on the order of seconds for each library—this makes
it practical for use in real development. We have shown
that LFI is useful even when run without human assistance
and no access to documentation or source code—it was able
to increase test coverage even on the extensive MySQL test
suite, by exercising recovery code paths that are not touched
by regular testing. The performance overhead incurred dur-
ing fault injection is negligible, which means that program
behavior remains realistic during testing.
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